Introduction
Jerry Cohen's important and trenchantly argued papers on equality and equal access to advantage have played a major role in shaping contemporary debates about equality and justice.
1 A central issue in his disagreements with John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin is the question of when individuals are properly held responsible for their choices, tastes and preferences. In this essay I will examine the ideas of responsibility that figure in the debate between Cohen and Rawls. My aim will be to determine how far Cohen disagrees with Rawls and what it is that they disagree about.
Three questions can be at issue in this debate. The first is when and why justice demands some form of equality. The second is what kind of equality justice requires in various situations. The third is how the demands of equality can be modified by the choices individuals have made, or the opportunities to choose that they have had.
The last of these questions can be subsumed within an answer to the second, It is particularly helpful to keep in mind the independence of these three questions when one is arguing from examples. Faced with a case in which it seems just for people to have unequal shares of some good X, one can explain this by appealing to one's answer to any of the three questions. One can say that this is not a case in which justice requires equality, or that what is required is not equality of X, or that the particular inequality in question is permitted because it results from a choice by the individual who has less.
In regard to the first question, Cohen is not, in these articles, a strict egalitarian. He is making what he calls only a "weak equalisandum claim" about what is to be equalized insofar as equalization is defensible. 2 And he allows that equality may have to be balanced against other values (even, it seems, in determining what is just.)
In regard to the second question (taken as distinct from the third), Cohen is not a welfarist-he does not hold that welfare, understood either as happiness or as preference satisfaction, is the thing that should (leaving choice aside) be equalized to the extent that anything should be equalized. Advantage, as he understands it, is "a heterogeneous collection of desirable states of the person reducible neither to his resources bundle nor to his welfare level." 3 And he says that "in deciding both what qualifies as an advantage and the relative sizes of advantages, it is necessary to engage in objective assessment" rather than merely to take the answer given by the preferences of the individual in question. 4 Cohen takes equality of welfare as the starting point of his inquiry in both of these articles, but he is not wedded to this position. Faced with some cases in which justice does not seem to require equal levels of preference satisfaction, he responds in the second way described above, by moving away from pure welfarism and invoking a constraint on the preferences whose satisfaction is relevant to equality. Thus, for example, he agrees with Rawls's observation that "offensive tastes" such as a preference that other people should suffer have no claim to satisfaction.
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Cohen takes a different line, however, in response to examples of "expensive tastes" raised by Rawls and Dworkin. Rawls invites us to "Imagine two persons, one satisfied with a diet of milk, bread and beans, while the other is distraught without expensive wines and exotic dishes. In short, one has expensive tastes, the other does There seem to be two reasons for this. The first, and more fundamental, reason is that although Cohen's notion of advantage is not purely welfarist, preference satisfaction and states such as contentment and frustration play a significant role in this notion-certainly more significant than in Rawls's theory, where they have no role at all. This is an important point of disagreement, which I will return to below.
The second reason is that Cohen is unhappy with the way that Rawls and Dworkin invoke ideas of choice and responsibility, and he wants to explore this issue. I will begin by taking up this question.
7 Currency, p. 914. To be precise, the position he suggests we move to is equality of opportunity for advantage. But in the cases at hand it is opportunity for welfare, in either its hedonistic or preference satisfaction versions, that is at issue.
Rawls and Cohen on Responsibility for One's Ends and Preferences
Cohen quotes Rawls as follows on the subject of expensive tastes.
As moral persons citizens have some part in forming and cultivating their final ends and preferences. It is not by itself an objection to the use of primary goods that it does not accommodate those with expensive tastes.
One must argue in addition that it is unreasonable, if not unjust, to hold such persons responsible for their preferences and to require them to make out as best they can. But to argue this seems to presuppose that citizens' preferences are beyond their control as propensities or cravings which simply happen. Citizens seem to be regarded as passive carriers of desires.
The use of primary goods … relies on a capacity to assume responsibility for our ends. In contrast to those in groups I and II, items in group III (ends a person has adopted and actions she has decides to take) are objects of choice. We do not always choose the ends or actions that we judge to be supported by the best reasons, but insofar as we choose these things for reasons at all, the range of our choices is limited by facts about what strikes us as reasons-that is to say, by factors of the kinds in groups I and II, which are not themselves chosen (except perhaps in those limited cases of selfmanipulation.) Nonetheless, there sometimes remains a range of ends or courses of action each of which there is sufficient reason to adopt. (Perhaps these reasons are even equally good.) In such cases we may properly be said to choose among these eligible options. In such cases, in addition to being responsible (answerable, and liable to criticism) for our ends in the senses so far discussed, it is also true that we could have avoided having them, by choosing differently. But this is so only in this special class of cases.
The term, 'preference', is sometimes used so broadly as to cover items in all three of the groups I have described: matters of taste, desires that involve seeing things as reasons (such as a desire for revenge), and ends that we have chosen. These things vary widely both in their objective importance and in the kinds of control we have over them. 9 The claims made in this paragraph and the preceding one are explained and defended more fully in institutions surely should be judged on is their contribution to individuals' ability to pursue their ends. Some ends are much more expensive (require much more in the way of resources) than others. So why doesn't equality demand that those with expensive ends be given a larger share of resources than others receive, so that they can attain a similar level of success in fulfilling their life projects?
It seems clear to me that equality does not require this. But how can this claim be defended? One thing that might be said is that, within the limits mentioned above, individuals have a choice about which ends to pursue. So they cannot complain if the ends they choose are more expensive than those of others.
As Cohen correctly notes, however, it is not sufficient simply to appeal to the fact that individuals have a choice about which ends to adopt. One must defend the more complicated proposition that individuals can reasonably be asked to accept the consequences of these choices. This depends on many factors, including the severity of these consequences, the acceptability of the alternatives that the agent could have chosen, the meaning and importance for an agent of being able to make choices of this kind for him or herself, the conditions under which the choice was made, and the cost to others of providing individuals with better conditions for choosing or protecting agents against the adverse consequences of the choices they make.
As Cohen writes,
[T]he mere fact that you made a choice, and could have chosen otherwise (for example, not to buy that steak), no more shows that subsidy is out of order than does the mere fact that you could have chosen not to buy that wheelchair shows that subsidy is out of order. In each case, facts in the background to the choice, facts about degrees of control, and about the cost of alternatives, affect the proper allocation of responsibility for the consequences of the choice.
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I would put this point by saying that the claim that the state is not responsible for the extra expense of realizing a person's ends is a judgment of substantive responsibility. This is distinct from the sense of responsibility I discussed above (responsibility as attributability), in which to claim that a person is responsible for a certain action is merely to claim that this action is attributable to him in the sense required for it to be a basis of moral assessment. By contrast, judgments of substantive responsibility are explicitly claims of this latter sort. So, for example, when we say that it is the responsibility of parents to see to it that their six year old children attend school, we mean that it is the parents who have a duty to do this, rather than, say, the children themselves, or some third party. And when we say that the cost of servicing and maintaining a car is the responsibility of the person who leases it, this means that this person, rather than the actual owner of the car, is obligated to provide that maintenance. Such a judgment leaves it open whether, if a person fails to do what he is substantively responsible for doing, he is responsible for this failure the first sense of "responsible" that I distinguished. If, for example, parents fail to get their child to school because they are in a coma, then they are not responsible (open to 12 moral criticism) for this failure even though it remains true that getting the child to school was their (substantive) responsibility.
The fact that an action resulted from a person's conscious choice may be sufficient to establish that that action can be attributed to her in the sense that is presupposed by moral appraisal. But a judgment of substantive responsibility depends on more than this. To justify the claim that a person who has done A has a certain obligation, or that someone who has done A has to bear the consequences (and that others are not obligated to share this burden) it is not enough to point out that this person chose to do A.
One must also consider the costs that this assignment of responsibility imposes on a person who does A, the alternatives to A that are available to a person in this situation, and the implications, for this person and others, of assigning responsibility in some other way.
The question of whether individuals are responsible for their ends in a sense that means that they have no claim to special aid if these ends are particularly expensive to pursue is thus a question of substantive responsibility. The point being made earlier was just that this question cannot be answered by merely appealing to the fact that agents are responsible for their ends in the sense of being properly asked to defend them, or properly subject to criticism (moral or other) for them, or even by merely appealing to the fact (when it is a fact) that agents choose their ends. Further argument is required to establish a claim of substantive responsibility. Cohen appears to be making this same point when he writes, So there is no disagreement between Cohen and Rawls about the kind of argument that needs to be offered for the relevant claims of responsibility. They do, however, appear to have substantive disagreements about which claims of this kind are correct. Rawls holds that individuals are responsible for (need not be compensated for) expensive tastes, whether or not these are chosen, and for expensive ends, which are under their control only to a degree. Cohen seems to disagree with these claims, or at least with the first of them. One advantage of the kind of argument that Cohen rightly rejects is that it might offer a way of settling this disagreement. If we could establish, on some independent ground, that individuals are responsible for their preferences (perhaps simply because they have chosen them) then, using an argument of this form, we could conclude that justice does not require the state to compensate those with expensive tastes.
But if such arguments are not valid, because judgments of substantive responsibility of the kind that form their conclusion depend on many factors, of which choice or control is only one, then it is more difficult to see how one can construct a decisive and nonquestion-begging argument in support of a conclusion about the proper social division of responsibility. This is a large topic, but I will survey some of the possibilities.
First, one might appeal to practical considerations, such as the difficulty and intrusiveness of having governments determine individuals' levels of satisfaction, or to the (potentially unlimited?) costs of providing for the pursuit of ends that require expensive equipment, travel and other opportunities. Given these considerations, and the facts about choice mentioned above, wouldn't our obligations to each other, and the demands of equality, be best fulfilled by providing each individual with the same set of goods and opportunities, to use in pursuing whatever ends he or she may choose? Rawls seems to appeal to such considerations when he speaks of the need to find "workable criteria for interpersonal comparisons." 16 And Cohen seems to endorse this kind of argument as well, when he writes that
The right argument says: it is extremely difficult and/or unacceptably intrusive to determine whether a person's tastes are expensive and how much she is responsible for them; therefore the state cannot and/or should not seek to make determinations of that sort; therefore people must (on the whole) take responsibility for the costs of their tastes.
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So there is general agreement on the relevance of this line of argument, but it remains somewhat inclusive. How much practical difficulty or "intrusiveness" is enough to justify the conclusion that compensation for expensive tastes is "not the states business"?
An alternative would be to argue from examples, using the method of reflective equilibrium. Since there is disagreement about the examples, an important part of this strategy, on Rawls's side, would consist trying to undermine the force of examples that are cited in support of the claim that people whose ends are expensive should receive compensation. Three examples that Cohen cites are: a person who finds the taste of ordinary water "gagging," a person who cannot stand eggs but lives in a place where fish and eggs are the only available nutrients and fish is much more expensive, and a person who cannot perform ordinary physical movements without pain. In each case, Cohen believes that equality requires that people be "compensated" for these special difficulties.
It seems to me that special treatment may be called for some of in these cases.
The question is why this is so, and what general conclusion is to be drawn. Although these cases literally involve tastes, or receptivity to pleasant and unpleasant feelings, it is somewhat misleading to describe them as cases of "expensive tastes." The people in these examples do not have unusual tastes. They want the same things that everyone wants: nourishment, hydration, and the ability to move freely. The normative force of the examples derives from the objective importance of these interests, rather than from the value of satisfying special tastes or preferences. The problem these people have is that they cannot pursue these quite ordinary aims without pain, or gagging, or feelings of disgust. What they need is help in overcoming these obstacles. This help might be provided by giving them water or food that they like better, or money to buy it. But it could just as well be given by providing access to medical treatment. the degree that individuals' choices are due to these factors they do not constitute moral desert, and that it is impracticable to determine the degree to which this is so. But, Cohen asks, if individuals' responsibility for exerting themselves is in this way a matter of degree, why isn't their responsibility for the tastes they develop also a matter of degree, depending on the degree to which this is a matter of choice and the degree to which it reflects outside constraints and influences?
Even this more carefully drawn charge of inconsistency misses the mark, however. Both Cohen and Nozick seem to assume that in the passage about desert and 21 Nozick is here relying on a distinctively libertarian view according to which respect for individual autonomy (or "liberty") requires two things: (1) not interfering with individual's choices in certain specified ways (by force or fraud) and (2) treating all choices that individuals make in the absence of these interferences as morally binding. Given this view, it may appear that Rawls is claiming to be a defender of autonomy while at some points failing to respect it, by violating (2). But this is not inconsistency on Rawls's part, since he rejects this libertarian premise. One of his main points is that individual autonomy is respected by providing conditions under which it can be meaningfully exercised, not by holding individuals responsible for the choices they make under unfavorable conditions. effort that they both quote Rawls is arguing against the idea of rewarding people in proportion to the effort they put forth. Elsewhere in A Theory of Justice Rawls does argue against this idea (although he also offers a qualified defense), and I will return to this argument shortly. But what Rawls is arguing against in the passage quoted by Cohen and
Nozick is the different idea that economic reward should be proportional to desert, or moral worth.
This argument is part of Rawls's larger strategy of showing that his two principles of justice fit with our considered judgments about justice in reflective equilibrium. Even if these principles are supported by the argument from the Original Position, if they were in direct conflict with our considered judgments about justice, then we would need to consider whether to modify or abandon these judgments or to modify or abandon the principles and the Original Position construction that yields them. Large parts of A Theory of Justice are thus devoted to the task of showing that various conflicts of this kind should be resolved in favor of the two principles of justice-that is to say, to arguing that various judgments that have some intuitive appeal but conflict with Rawls's two principles of justice do not stand the test of reflection and should be modified or abandoned.
In §12, for example, Rawls considers the idea that individuals are entitled to whatever they would receive in a free market (a "system of natural liberty") and argues that this should not, on reflection, be counted as a considered judgment. In §47 Rawls considers various "common sense precepts of justice" such as the ideas that justice requires reward in accord with contribution (marginal productivity), or in proportion to effort, or in proportion to need. These familiar precepts are not fundamental principles of justice on Rawls's view, but in §47 he tries to account for them by explaining how they can properly play a role in our thinking about justice at a more derivative level, as responses to questions about distribution that arise under special, but not uncommon, conditions within a just society. So, for example, the idea of reward according to effort has a role in a society governed by Rawls's Difference Principle in the form of the argument that extra compensation should be offered to defray costs of training and to compensate people for performing particularly onerous and unpleasant tasks.
In §48 Rawls takes a firmer line with regard to the idea that economic reward should be distributed according to moral desert. This idea, he argues in the last part of this section, does not stand up under reflection, and should be rejected. Earlier in §48, however, he points out that none of the common sense precepts of justice discussed in §47 would require economic reward to track moral desert. His aim here is to show how the idea of reward according to desert differs from these common sense precepts, thus depriving that idea of the support it might derive from them.
The common sense precept that might seem to come closest to requiring reward in proportion to moral worth, Rawls says, is the precept of distribution according to effort. It is in this context that we encounter the passage Cohen and Nozick discuss, in which Rawls says, "the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their greater good fortune." Therefore, he concludes, "the idea of rewarding desert is impracticable." 22 Rawls's point here is not that reward should not be proportioned to effort because differences in the degree of effort that people put forth is due in part to differences in ability and in family circumstances. It is rather that because effort is influenced by these factors differences in effort do not correspond to differences in moral worth. So in proportioning reward to effort we would not be rewarding moral worth, and it would be "impracticable" to design institutions that would identify and reward those differences in effort that do reflect differences in moral worth. Rawls offers two objections to the liberal conception, the second of which is that given the background of an unregulated free market, fair equality of opportunity "can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists." This is so, he says, because
The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances. It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery.
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The general point that Rawls is making here is that the liberal conception purports to combine elements that are in fact incompatible with one another. Fair equality of opportunity cannot be achieved simply by adding on to a market system something like a legal requirement of non-discrimination, because the inequality in family wealth and income that an unregulated market will produce guarantees inequality in the opportunity to develop one's talents.
The requirement of fair equality of opportunity specifies that individuals with (a) the same level of talent and ability and (b) the same willingness to use these should have the same chances of success whatever income class they are born into. These two clauses correspond to two justifications that might be offered to an individual who complains about having a smaller share of income of wealth than some others do. One thing one might say to such a person, corresponding to clause (a), is that the others have been given more because they have a talent or ability which he lacks. (If this is to be a good response, the relevant "talent or ability" must be something that there is a good justification for rewarding with special opportunities or benefits. I will take this to be understood.)
A second response, corresponding to clause (b), is that although the individual in question has the same talent or ability he has not been willing to develop and use it in the way that justifies reward. The force of this response is, "You can't complain, because you were put in as good a position as you could ask for to develop talents that would have qualified for reward and you failed to do so." But, Rawls argues, whether people have been put in such a position depends on whether they have been provided with the "happy family and social circumstances" that are required in order to stimulate the development of talent in early childhood. His remark about being "deserving in the ordinary sense" can be understood in this same way. If an individual's family and social circumstances were very unfavorable, then we cannot say that her failure to develop her talents shows her to be undeserving of reward "in the ordinary sense." That is to say, it does not show that she failed to take advantage of a fair opportunity to succeed. Moral worth is not here at issue.
This argument is quite consistent with what Rawls says about responsibility for one's ends. Both arguments involve the idea that if an outcome results from a choice that an individual has made under conditions for making that choice that are as good as he could ask for, then he cannot complain about that outcome-it is "his responsibility."
But everything depends on the conditions mentioned in the crucial italicized phrase.
What Rawls is saying in the passage I have been discussing is that under the "liberal conception" there is no assurance that the conditions under which individuals decide whether to exert themselves, or to develop their talents, will be good enough to give these decisions legitimating force. What he is saying in his defense of primary social goods is that in a well-ordered society governed by his two principles of justice these conditions will be good enough, and that individuals can therefore reasonably be asked to accept responsibility for the ends they adopt. One can dispute this latter claim, but it is not inconsistent with the former one.
Where Do Cohen and Rawls Disagree?
I have said several times that Cohen and Rawls appear to disagree about whether people should be compensated if their tastes are particularly difficult to satisfy. They certainly disagree insofar as they are talking about the same thing. There is, however, some reason to think that they are not always talking about the same thing. This makes it more difficult than one might have expected to be clear about the exact nature of their disagreement.
Rawls proposes the notion of primary social goods as what I will call a "metric": a measure of distributive shares for use within a conception of justice. The role of a conception of justice as Rawls understands it is to serve as a shared standard that the members of a society can use to assess the basic institutions of their society and to adjudicate claims that individuals make about the way they should be treated by those institutions. A metric is one component of such a shared standard: a workable basis for comparing distributive shares.
To claim that primary social goods, or any other measure, is the appropriate metric for a conception of justice is therefore not necessarily to defend it as a conception of well-being. 25 The choice of a metric depends on claims about the proper role of the state (of "basic institutions") and about what can serve as a workable public standard for comparing the circumstances of different individuals. Claims about individual well being depend on neither of these things. The pleasure that a person gets from eating and the enjoyment he derives from leisure activities are among the components of his well-being.
But it is quite coherent to accept that this is so while claiming that the proper metric for purposes of justice should ignore these things, because these elements of well-being are not directly the concern of the state, and perhaps also because these pleasures are so difficult to assess and compare that they could not form part of a workable public standard.
Consider now the following remark of Cohen's:
A word about what will be meant by the sentence-form "x represents and injustice' here. It will not mean 'x represents an injustice that ought to be rectified by the state.' (No one should in any case think that that's what 'x represents an injustice' ordinarily means: the words 'that ought to be rectified by the state' surely add meaning to the phrase that they expand.)
It will mean, more elementarily, that the world is less than fully just by virtue of the presence of x in it. So, to be as clear as possible, if, in the sequel, I say such things as 'compensation is required by egalitarian justice,' I mean: for there to be egalitarian justice, there must be compensation; and not: there must (unconditionally) be compensation, because of the (unoverridable and always implementable) requirements of egalitarian distributive justice.
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The first four sentences of this passage seem to suggest that "egalitarian justice" 
